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Key Points
·  In recent years, strategy has been a much-
discussed topic in philanthropy, while tactics have 
received little attention.
· The experience of the MacArthur Foundation’s 
environmental program and its Moving Spotlight 
approach provide examples of the importance of 
tactical decisions.
· Tactical decisions such as the timing of grants, 
foundation staffing levels, and the timing of evalu-
ations all contribute to grantees’ ability to achieve 
outcomes.
· Structure and flexibility can be complementary 
approaches to grantmaking if the tactics are well 
thought out.
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Strategy has become a buzzword in the large and 
growing literature that offers advice to philan-
thropists and managers of private foundations. 
Despite the variety of voices, the message is uni-
form: To be effective, philanthropy must become 
strategic. Implicit in this advice is the conten-
tion that private foundations in general have not 
been particularly effective because they have not 
been sufficiently strategic. This position presents 
significant problems because, at a minimum, the 
meaning of strategy is poorly articulated1 and 
alleged donor failures are almost never described 
in any detail.
1 See Prosico, T. (2000). In other words: A plea for plain 
speaking by foundations, pp. 19-21, (New York: Edna Mc-
Connell Clark Foundation), for an pointed but amusing 
critique of the overuse and misuse of the word. Every 
advocate of “strategic philanthropy” should read it.
An old concept in warfare and international poli-
tics, the notion of strategy has been adopted (and 
adapted) by management professors for use in 
their classes, books, and consulting trade. In the 
process they have reduced the clarity of the word. 
Applications of the term more recently to philan-
thropy have muddied its meaning even further.
In military and diplomatic parlance, a key distinc-
tion exists between strategy and tactics, and that 
distinction contributes to the definition of both 
terms. The difference between them is not ob-
scure, but it has become vague or even immaterial 
in much of the current literature about private 
giving. The tactical aspects of philanthropy rarely 
receive serious attention, and the distinction has 
largely been lost in the vigorous, but sometimes 
misconceived, discussion in books, articles, 
and blogs about what philanthropy needs.2 This 
pattern of thought seems to imply that strategy 
describes everything a foundation must do to 
improve its performance or that the tactical ele-
ments of philanthropy are so obvious to all that 
they raise no substantial questions.
A traditional definition of these concepts is that 
strategy consists of one’s goals and that tactics are 
about methods or techniques for achieving those 
goals. In other words, strategy is substantive and 
2 For example, in Frumkin, P. (2006). The essence of strategic 
giving (Chicago: University of Chicago), a thoughtful exam-
ination of challenges in philanthropy, the author advocates 
order and discipline but treats several tactical dimensions 
as basic elements of “strategic giving” (pp. 61-68, 77-103). 
Paul Brest, in “A Decade of Outcome-Oriented Philan-
thropy,” Stanford Social Innovation Review (Spring 2012), 
further demonstrates the ambiguity of the concept.
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tactics are procedural.3 From that position, it fol-
lows that both strategy and tactics must be closely 
considered to achieve major philanthropic objec-
tives. A substantial imbalance in thinking about 
both of these basic dimensions can result in lower 
returns on donors’ investments. The purpose of 
this article is to suggest ways of diminishing that 
risk in the management of private foundations 
through a closer examination of the range of op-
tions in grantmaking tactics.
In philanthropy, tactics are about choices of style 
and method in making grants or loans. They are 
not about a donor’s objectives – which do need 
to be sharply defined to avoid scattering scarce 
resources. Assuming that any such objectives are 
inherently strategic, however, weakens the case 
for “strategic philanthropy.” How do we recognize 
genuinely strategic strategies? Clear strategy is 
truly essential, and being truly strategic requires 
more careful thought (and information) than 
merely announcing one’s goals. An objective stan-
dard for being strategic in private philanthropy is 
needed, but identifying appropriate elements for 
such a standard is a topic for a separate analysis.   
A pervasive problem with claims that foundations 
have failed to be sufficiently strategic is that many 
of these critics call for rigorous data-driven choic-
es and evidence-based evaluation of grantees, 
while they rarely apply such tests to the design 
or coherence of donors’ programs. Such analyses 
present little specific evidence to support asser-
tions about the present or past shortcomings of 
private philanthropy or the need for new modes 
of operation. Claims about the broad inadequacy 
of foundations in general are simply posited and 
seldom questioned. Where are the data support-
ing this view of American philanthropic history 
and the closely related advice widely offered to 
donors? 4
3 Although these terms can be subdivided, the fundamental 
distinction remains significant. See the introductory article 
in Kennedy, P. (Ed.), (1991). Grand strategy in war and 
peace, pp. 1-7. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
4 Susan Berresford, former president of the Ford Founda-
tion, explored such questions in “What’s the Problem With 
Strategic Philanthropy?” in the Chronicle of Philanthropy 
(October 2010), p. 33.
More attention to the history of private foun-
dation actions could add useful perspective to 
current discussions about philanthropic effective-
ness. Matching the global influence exercised 
over many years by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
for example, would be difficult. The steep increase 
in the number of American foundations and their 
financial resources during the last 25 or 30 years 
neither diminishes the results of earlier philan-
thropic efforts nor justifies clams that we live in a 
new “golden age” of philanthropy. Unfortunately, 
more is not necessarily better.
At the very least, some balance is needed in the 
consideration of foundation effectiveness and 
the role of strategy (however the term is defined) 
in achieving significant results. Because tactical 
choices are widely overlooked, taken for granted, 
or conflated with strategy, increased analysis of 
tactical options – and of history – would be use-
ful additions to the discourse about designing and 
managing grantmaking programs and elevating 
the influence of private philanthropic actions. 5
5 Stannard-Stockton (2007) separates tactics from strategy, 
but focuses on varied legal instruments rather than on 
methods for making grants.
In philanthropy, tactics are about 
choices of style and method in 
making grants or loans. They are not 
about a donor’s objectives – which 
do need to be sharply defined to 
avoid scattering scarce resources. 
Assuming that any such objectives 
are inherently strategic, however, 
weakens the case for “strategic 
philanthropy.” How do we recognize 
genuinely strategic strategies?
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The most unusual choice was 
presenting grant recommendations 
to the foundation’s board of 
directors in integrated portfolios 
for each of the program’s geographic 
focal areas and thematic categories 
simultaneously and almost entirely 
at recurring three-year intervals. 
We called this tactical pattern “the 
Moving Spotlight.”
To illustrate the large role that tactics can have in 
a foundation’s work, the specific experience of the 
MacArthur Foundation’s environment program, 
which the author directed for its first 15 years, 
might provide some relevant examples. The fol-
lowing report describes the somewhat unusual 
tactical approaches taken by that program, but it 
is not meant to offer a model that other founda-
tions should adopt. Its point is that the range 
of available tactics is broader than is commonly 
recognized in the design of foundation programs, 
and its aim is to encourage more tactical experi-
mentation.
Background:  Strategic Choices Set the 
Stage
Beginning in 1986, the MacArthur environment 
program explored both strategic and tactical 
options for its grantmaking and adopted some 
unconventional practices.  Probably the most 
unusual choice was presenting grant recommen-
dations to the foundation’s board of directors in 
integrated portfolios for each of the program’s 
geographic focal areas and thematic categories 
simultaneously and almost entirely at recurring 
three-year intervals. We called this tactical pat-
tern “the Moving Spotlight.”
The program’s geographic targets were the bio-
diversity hotspots, first described by the British 
ecologist Norman Myers (1988). Myers’ analysis 
gave MacArthur an objective, data-driven way 
to focus its program rather than relying on the 
unexplained preferences of board or staff mem-
bers, which often shape foundation strategies. 
The hotspots were relevant as a way of organizing 
a global nature conservation program because 
more than 50 percent of known terrestrial species 
of plants and animals occur in those areas that 
cover less than two percent of the Earth’s land 
surface. They were further defined by estimates of 
endemism and degree of threat or destruction – 
all coarse but quantifiable and open criteria. Con-
centrated locations and countability made species 
diversity an explainable choice. Those tight foci 
allowed us to function globally in a plausible way 
with a small staff and a relatively small budget 
(never more than $20 million per year).
Taking other strategic decisions, we concentrated 
even more narrowly on the tropical hotspots, 
situated in low-income regions that possessed 
little local conservation capacity, and omitting 
those in temperate and Mediterranean zones, lo-
cated mostly in more affluent countries. In other 
words, we chose our geographic targets through 
the application of objective and relevant screens, 
which we could, and did, explain publicly.
Later, we expanded our strategic focal points to 
include the most species-diverse marine areas, 
mostly in the southwestern Pacific. With a catego-
ry of thematic grants, the program also attempted 
to advance environmental law, conservation sci-
ence, training for natural resource managers, and 
sustainable economic development but only as 
actions in those fields affected the sharply defined 
regions in which we worked.
This report aims to describe both our use of the 
“spotlight” approach in those contexts and the 
strong connections between the strategic choices 
and tactical methods employed in the concrete 
case of the MacArthur program. They shaped 
each other. Tactics are mundane considerations 
compared to grand strategy, and process concerns 
are often viewed as the preoccupations of overly 
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bureaucratic organizations, but they are inher-
ently consequential for private foundations in 
pursuing their goals.
Each of the following sections explores an appar-
ently routine aspect of administrative processes 
common to nearly all private foundation pro-
grams. All of them can be managed in a variety of 
ways – more ways than are routinely considered. 
Deciding how much staff is required to carry out 
a grantmaking program properly, for example, is 
rarely discussed by observers of private founda-
tion practice. Neither that decision nor the timing 
for awarding grants commands much thought by 
those observers, but they can be significant design 
elements, as shown by the MacArthur program’s 
experience.
Staffing and Timing: How Do Bureaucratic 
Size and Rhythm Affect Results?
We adopted the "spotlight" pattern largely so 
we could operate globally with a very small staff 
(three program officers, each responsible for a 
continental region), thereby minimizing adminis-
trative costs and maximizing the funds available 
for awarding grants. Starting in Latin America, 
we expanded into nine geographic target zones, 
three per continent in three-year cycles, giving 
each program officer the task of preparing one 
set of grants per year in one region, presented for 
board approval all at the same time.
That steady rhythm put a visible emphasis (or 
spotlight) on our development of custom-tailored 
strategies for each hotspot. These diverse plans 
were expressed through portfolios of grants 
meant to produce converging and mutually rein-
forcing effects.  Seeking synergy among grantees 
is not a rare practice, but awarding all grants for a 
major category simultaneously for three-year pe-
riods was (and still is) eccentric. While following 
this pattern, we could also describe the options 
we had decided not to pursue – and why – rather 
than just listing our preferences and calling them 
strategies.
As a result of this process, program officers could 
plan their investigations of regional conditions 
and applicants’ capabilities around the dates, 
published far in advance, when they would make 
their single annual presentations to the Founda-
tion’s board. These presentations provided the 
reasoning (or theories of change) for proposed 
clusters of actions, information about individual 
grantees, and how their effects were expected to 
converge. This process took seriously the concept 
of portfolio effects in grantmaking.
By considering staff recommendations in these 
clusters, the board of directors and the Founda-
tion’s managers could more easily see, question, 
and understand what the program staff sought to 
accomplish in each portfolio. We also were able 
to explain our actions to grant seekers working 
in our target regions, displaying our consistency 
and reducing their need to guess about the 
Foundation’s intentions. That scrutiny pressed 
our program officers to produce relatively well-
defined and justified plans for each hotspot at 
three-year intervals as we applied our common 
procedural approach to deeply varied situations 
in many tropical countries. In other words, our 
Tactics are mundane considerations 
compared to grand strategy, and 
process concerns are often viewed 
as the preoccupations of overly 
bureaucratic organizations, but 
they are inherently consequential 
for private foundations in pursuing 
their goals. Deciding how much 
staff is required to carry out a 
grantmaking program properly, 
for example, is rarely discussed by 
observers of private foundation 
practice.
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tactical process, used in every place, influenced 
our substantive strategies, which were unique in 
each place. (Table 1 illustrates how the Moving 
Spotlight moved, as projected in 2000.)
While keeping the program staff small was 
initially motivated by the desire to minimize ad-
ministrative costs, maintaining a lean staff, based 
entirely in Chicago, also offered the advantage that 
we were less able to concern ourselves with the 
detailed management of the work supported by 
our grants. A large staff with a substantial number 
of industrial country experts can (and inevitably 
does) intrude on the conduct of grant-supported 
work. They inexorably provide detailed guidance, 
require extensive reporting, and reduce the time 
grantees have for implementing their programs. 
Such supervision can constrain grantees’ creativ-
ity, limit their resilience when conditions change, 
and reduce their prospects for long-term success.6 
In that way, too many foundations and major 
donors work against their own goals.
One of the great advantages possessed by private 
foundations is that they need not burden them-
selves or their clients with the ponderous bureau-
cratic procedures required by most government 
agencies. For that reason, it is particularly ironic 
when some (mostly larger) foundations adopt 
procedures and operating styles similar to those 
commonly employed by public sector donors. 
Private foundations are uniquely positioned to 
6 Andrew Natsios, a former Administrator of the US 
Agency for International Development, describes at length 
the negative effects of “Obsessive Measurement Disorder” 
in The Clash of the Counter-bureaucracy and Development 
(Center for Global Development, 2010).
take calculated risks while seeking influence that 
exceeds their financial capacity. That universal 
condition makes highly risk-averse behavior by 
any foundation, at the very least, unfortunate.
Operating with a small staff also necessarily 
reduced the number of grants we could sensibly 
award and limited our use of small, highly specific, 
and labor-intensive actions. This condition reflects 
the very low correlation that exists between the 
size of foundation grants and the amount of staff 
time required to process them diligently. Small 
grants, carefully awarded, often take as much staff 
time as substantially larger grants. In many cases 
small grants are useful, but the cost implications 
of using them extensively (a tactical choice) are 
inescapable. They can also lead to scattering one’s 
resources, a pervasive risk and common short-
coming in private philanthropy.
Because of the power dynamic between donors 
and grantees, the detailed oversight possible for 
a large staff frequently reduces the usefulness of 
grants intended to strengthen recipient institu-
tions. As we learned from experience, even gentle 
suggestions from program officers are routinely 
seized upon by grant seekers whether they are 
good ideas or not. Believing the inevitable flat-
tery that comes with their jobs is a pleasant but 
genuine mental health hazard for foundation staff 
members – with fairly frequent negative effects 
(Menninger, 1981).
Because the Moving Spotlight relied on clusters of 
explicitly interdependent grants rather than more 
conventional lists of probably meritorious projects 
that might (or might not) be strongly related to 
TABLE 1  The Moving Spotlight
Year AFRICA ASIA-PACIFIC LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN
2001 Lower Guinean Forest Melanesia Insular Caribbean
2002  Madagascar                   Indo-Burma Southern Andes
2003 Albertine Rift Sundaland Northern Andes
2004 Lower Guinean Forest Melanesia Insular Caribbean
2005 Madagascar Indo-Burma Southern Andes
2006 Albertine Rift Sundaland Northern Andes
Tactics in Philanthropy
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A central element of this process 
was asking for evaluations of our 
staff’s portfolio designs as well 
as reports on the performance of 
our grantees, thereby gauging our 
contributions as well as theirs. 
We asked: Did the effects of our 
grants cohere or converge in ways 
that we anticipated? Did we 
adequately understand the concrete 
circumstances of our grantees in 
quite varied regions?
each other, we believed that it increased our pros-
pects of achieving meaningful (i.e., long-term) 
influence. We told ourselves that the collective 
effect of these clusters should be more substantial 
and durable than separate actions awarded seri-
ally. Assessing the validity of such an assumption, 
however, is best done by others – and seeking 
such judgments was an integral part of our stan-
dard tactical practice.
Monitoring and Evaluation:  Does Nothing 
Happen Unless It’s Measured?
Portfolios of grants, presented as tightly woven 
packages, also served to strengthen the system-
atic evaluation of the program’s work. Because 
of this method of grantmaking, our evalua-
tion process could consider the effects of entire 
clusters in addition to assessing the results of 
individual awards. The metaphor we used was 
that our grants should form tapestries of action 
rather than loose strands of yarn. The question 
was whether our weaving produced coherent and 
relevant patterns or results.
Within the three-year recurring cycles, evaluation 
could be conducted on a routine basis, becom-
ing prospective as well as retrospective. To start, 
considering varied proposals in defined areas at 
the same time allows direct comparisons among 
them – a logical advantage not available when 
grants are awarded in the standard manner, seria-
tim and at random intervals. This is an extremely 
simple point that is not widely recognized in the 
processes used by foundations with professional 
staffing.
Program officers and our grants administrator 
reviewed grantees’ annual reports and reported 
major developments at routine meetings of the 
program team. Our receipt of annual reports trig-
gered the release of annual payments as sched-
uled, unless a major problem arose. Intervention 
by foundation staff while a grant was active, 
however, was rare. We tried to monitor grant-
supported actions without presuming to direct 
them.
The distinction between conscientious monitor-
ing and attempting to manage grantees is funda-
mental, but is sometimes missed by foundation 
officials. Consistent monitoring is an essential ele-
ment of ongoing evaluation, but it becomes diffi-
cult to evaluate grantees’ performance objectively 
when they are being managed in some detail by 
donor-agency staff. Maintaining an appropri-
ate distance from grantees enhances meaningful 
evaluation and allows more staff learning from 
their grantmaking experience. Because MacAr-
thur had chosen ambitious objectives, we did not 
view small scale or short-term measurements (or 
“metrics”) as sources of relevant learning from 
our work.
When the end of the standard three-year time 
spans of our portfolios approached, the founda-
tion’s evaluation director hired two external con-
sultants (normally one American with relevant 
expertise and one practitioner from the region in 
question) to meet independently with grantees, 
examine emerging results, and compare them 
with the original theories of change presented 
by program staff when the grants were awarded. 
Their reports were given to the board of direc-
tors, often in person, and their comments directly 
influenced staff plans for subsequent clusters of 
grants.
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A central element of this process was asking for 
evaluations of our staff’s portfolio designs as well 
as reports on the performance of our grantees, 
thereby gauging our contributions as well as 
theirs. We asked: Did the effects of our grants 
cohere or converge in ways that we anticipated? 
Did we adequately understand the concrete 
circumstances of our grantees in quite varied 
regions? Did we achieve any meaningful leverage 
or influence with the behavior of other major ac-
tors: local communities, states, multilateral banks, 
foreign aid agencies, or business firms? Did our 
grants, in other words, support or precipitate 
more progress toward our strategic goals than we 
could directly buy with the foundation’s money? 
The answers, of course, were varied.
Transparency and Efficiency:  Reducing 
Costs by Opening the Windows
The Moving Spotlight also contributed to the pro-
gram’s efficiency by reducing the number of pro-
posals that received close attention from our staff. 
By announcing the sequence of regions where we 
would make grants each year and closing dates 
for submitting proposals in them, we regulated 
the volume and structured the flow of incoming 
requests. We hoped that doing so elevated the 
quality of our discussions with grant seekers (our 
customers).
Because the movements of the “spotlight” were 
steady and predictable, those customers could 
plan ahead on presenting requests at appropriate 
times. Similarly, our relatively crisp, published 
guidelines helped them to avoid wasting their 
time with proposals that didn’t come close to 
fitting our program or its timing. By requesting 
simple, two-page letters of inquiry as the first step 
for each applicant, we could assess their potential 
fit and respond quickly, inviting full proposals 
from a fairly small number of them and explain-
ing to the others why we chose not to pursue their 
requests.
This procedure was designed to manage the flow 
of proposals without denying ourselves use-
ful information. Managing that flow is entirely 
necessary, but we concluded that reading only 
proposals invited by our staff (a very common 
foundation practice) was seriously unwise – we 
could too easily miss valuable possibilities. Our 
goal was to process fully only about two propos-
als for every grant awarded, thus minimizing the 
transactions costs to grant seekers of dealing with 
us. That ratio made our small staff adequate to 
doing a thorough job of reviewing proposals that 
appeared to be promising, devising integrated 
portfolios of new grants, and monitoring actions 
supported by existing grants in their regions.
We published newsletters after each meeting of 
the MacArthur board, describing the clusters of 
grants awarded to inform grant seekers about 
the foundation’s thinking as well as announc-
ing its actions. In these newsletters, we tried to 
explain the reasons for our new grants, more than 
simply listing them and their purposes. Publish-
ing the reasoning behind our choices was also 
intended to express respect for all our customers 
and to demonstrate how we adhered to our own 
guidelines, attempting to treat applicants fairly 
and consistently, seeking to work with them as 
trusted partners.  Transparency and discipline 
can simplify proposal review processes, constrain 
administrative expenses, build trusting relation-
ships, improve staff knowledge, and reduce the 
sense that dealing with a private foundation is like 
buying lottery tickets.         
Collective Learning Portfolios:  Who Does 
the Learning?
The program also organized meetings of all grant-
ees and other relevant informants in each area 
Transparency and discipline can 
simplify proposal review processes, 
constrain administrative expenses, 
build trusting relationships, 
improve staff knowledge, and reduce 
the sense that dealing with a private 
foundation is like buying lottery 
tickets. 
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shortly before the end of the three-year cycles 
to discuss grant-supported work and evolving 
regional situations in natural resources manage-
ment. These events were designed to stimulate 
participants’ learning from one another, give us 
feedback on our existing grants, and help us in 
designing subsequent clusters of actions. We 
conducted them in the regions under review, with 
travel costs paid by the Foundation.
Grantees in developing countries rarely have 
useful opportunities for interaction, particularly 
when the problems they deal with are not con-
strained by political frontiers, as is often the case. 
Ecosystems, rather than states, were our foci, and 
we wanted to build relevant networks among ac-
tors in the field.7 These events were equally useful 
for reviewing our clusters of thematic grants in 
the emergent fields of environmental law, sustain-
able forestry, and locally managed fisheries. They 
were generally successful in building personal 
connections among frontline actors, improving 
staff understanding of changing conditions on the 
ground, deepening our knowledge of grantees’ 
local reputations, and shaping our subsequent 
decisions about new and renewal grants.  
We assumed that the foundation would maintain 
its effort in each region or theme for at least three 
three-year cycles. In this way, we tried to be a 
reliable source of funding rather than an unpre-
dictable donor. At the same time, in response 
to grantees’ performance, changing regional 
circumstances, and what we learned in these 
meetings, we routinely adjusted the mix of our 
grants in each hotspot. Doing so only at three-
year intervals (rather than attempting to adjust 
continuously) allowed us to focus on significant 
changes that might not be understood as well at 
shorter intervals, and it led us to be deliberate and 
explicit about such shifts.
7 The largely automatic use of political maps as the organiz-
ing structure of most international donor programs is a 
major strategic error when dealing with natural phenom-
ena (like ecosystems) or with the many cultural patterns 
that do not conform to state boundaries that were imposed 
by European powers without regard to significant local 
circumstances. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East 
are prime examples, but the problem of treating states as if 
they were somehow natural entities is widespread.
That habit, in turn, made it easy for us to ex-
plain such actions to the foundation’s public. 
We described this practice as being similar to 
stop-action photography, which improves the 
viewer’s perception of change as the camera’s 
shutter captures movement over time by opening 
and closing intermittently. The implicit contrast 
in this metaphor with the blurry pictures that 
result from time exposures was deliberate, and we 
worked to share what we learned this way with 
actors in each region or thematic category.
We aimed to conduct more thorough evalua-
tions about conditions in each region or theme at 
nine-year intervals to decide whether to continue 
or shift our focus. The foundation made several 
widely announced changes in the definition of its 
geographic targets, based on our experience, new 
data, and advice from panels of experts. Decisions 
to terminate or alter the program’s focal areas 
(strategic choices) included exit plans (a tactical 
choice) that allowed us to withdraw in a trans-
parent and tapered fashion. In these ways, we 
tried to advance collective learning and minimize 
potential damage to organizations that we had 
supported when we geared up in new areas.
Payment Schedules: Eccentricity With a 
Purpose
Another unusual practice was our consistent use 
of fixed, front-loaded, and declining payment 
Another unusual practice was our 
consistent use of fixed, front-loaded, 
and declining payment schedules, 
unrelated to the timing of expected 
expenditures by grantees. This 
meant that we paid most grantees a 
larger amount in the first year of a 
normal three-year award than they 
were likely to spend that year.
Martin
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schedules, unrelated to the timing of expected 
expenditures by grantees. This meant that we paid 
most grantees a larger amount in the first year of 
a normal three-year award than they were likely 
to spend that year. Then our schedules provided 
two smaller step-down payments in years two and 
three. For example, a grant for $600,000 might 
be paid out in annual installments of $250,000, 
$200,000, and $150,000. 
The intent of that eccentric practice was to avoid 
overly refined and inflexible budgets and to 
underscore the need for grantees to seek other 
donors to make their programs sustainable. It cre-
ated recurring benefits in budgeting and cash flow 
management for grantees and for the Founda-
tion. Recipients of these grants knew when they 
would receive our payments, and they did not 
have to wait for reimbursement after spending 
other scarce funds. This tactical policy made the 
Foundation’s budgeting easier because we avoided 
the uncertain timing of payout amounts and pre-
served our budget flexibility in future years.  
Grantees were neither held to spending grant 
funds on fixed schedules nor required to return 
funds not spent at the end of the formal term 
of their grants. They were also allowed to keep 
any interest they might earn on payments made 
before they spent our grant funds. We did not 
want tight budgeting to limit grantees’ responses 
to unexpected events (which alone are inevitable), 
and we wanted to escape any implication that our 
grants were like commercial purchase orders.
The program also awarded grants with round 
number totals (such as $750,000 over three 
years) in contrast to the conventional practice of 
granting precise amounts and time frames (such 
as $746,212 over 19 months), which suggest that 
the cost and timing of influential actions can be 
projected to the last penny or scheduled to occur 
at predetermined moments. These practices re-
flected our confidence in our grantees’ judgment 
about when they could most usefully spend grant 
funds and our appreciation of the uncertainties of 
nonprofit management and of money’s fungibility.
In many cases, we renewed grants that seemed to 
work well for additional three-year periods, but 
the declining payout schedules in each three-year 
cycle reduced the damage that could result when 
we decided not to include particular grantees 
in subsequent portfolios. Sudden changes in 
soft-money revenue present a perennial prob-
lem for nonprofit organizations, and the loss of 
overhead revenue when a major grant ends can be 
disruptive to an exaggerated degree. Our tactical 
approach was an attempt to limit that unintended 
effect, which is simply intrinsic to the project 
mode of grantmaking. Repeated flat annual pay-
ments, in particular, can create the expectation of 
continued support – until the donor decides to 
drop out. Too many nonprofit grantees have re-
lied on recurring one-year grants from long-term 
supporters, only to be injured, sometimes badly, 
when the apparently faithful source of revenue 
evaporates.
The reasoning behind our unconventional pay-
ment schedules was that the long-term opera-
tion of any substantial effort is bound to require 
multiple donors, and we believed that aiming for 
the long term is necessary for achieving major 
philanthropic goals. Private foundations are able, 
if they wish, to make more stable commitments 
than most government agencies, which can shift 
suddenly because of elections, political instability, 
or the whims of authoritarian rulers. Yet solitary 
long-term support of a grantee can lead to a form 
of ownership, as if the donor were an operating 
foundation, making objective evaluation difficult.  
If we alone could understand the value of a par-
ticular program after a reasonable demonstration 
period, a plausible assessment might be that our 
initial judgment had been defective.
Assembling Diverse Portfolios: Seeking 
Leverage With Unlikely Bedfellows 
The Moving Spotlight procedure incorporated the 
understanding that attempting to advance large-
scale social change of any kind is an extraordi-
narily challenging task and that such objectives 
call for complex, flexible, and custom-tailored 
responses. We sought diverse and unconventional 
combinations of grantees and actions in con-
structing the Foundations's responses. (See Figure 
1.) This approach also expressed our tactical com-
mitment to enveloping our targets from varied 
angles rather than using frontal attacks along a 
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Program Tactics: Diversity of Actions
Effective conservation requires a mixture of actions
Scientific Research
Formal Education 
(Professional & General)
Government Regulation & 
Legal Processes
Direct Conservation 
Projects (protected 
areas, advocacy) Policy Research
Market Signals
Informal Public Education
Program Tactics: Diversity of Actors
Effective conservation requires a mixture of actors
Scientific Institutions 
(zoos, botanic gardens, 
museums)
Universities & Schools
Government Agencies
Grassroots 
Organizations Think Tanks
Business 
Corporations
Mass Media (publishers & 
broadcasters)
Conservation - 
Development NGOs
Biodiversity
Conservation
Biodiversity
Conservation
FIGURE 1  Diversity of actions and actors can enhance results. 
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single axis, a style favored by some donors.
The point of the figure is that in each focal area 
the program staff considered a full range of op-
tions, as we saw them, among potential actors and 
actions. Then we attempted to find a unique mix-
ture of them that seemed likely to advance con-
servation in that particular place. The strategies 
that guided the design of each cluster of grants 
were products of this process, and they often in-
cluded unorthodox (or even unlikely) teammates. 
Although improved biodiversity conservation was 
the strategic target for the MacArthur program, a 
similar figure could usefully be constructed to de-
scribe the potential array of grantees and actions 
available in any field of philanthropy. 
However gratifying they may sound, simple, 
elegant solutions for large-scale human problems 
inevitably fall short of their intended results. The 
diversity of our world (and of our species) is too 
great to force into linear global plans, as demon-
strated by the failure of many highly sophisticated 
economic development projects guided by the 
“best” international experts. We assumed that in 
essentially every place, local is a synonym for real, 
and that social change will always be unpredict-
able and chaotic.
Similarly, we took it as a basic principle that 
achieving social change depends much more on 
the sustained efforts of deeply rooted creative 
leaders and resilient, persistent institutions than it 
does on the short-term, highly defined, and read-
ily measured projects required by many donors, 
both public and private. Our operating stance was 
that creative and effective leadership can rarely be 
expressed through remotely designed schemes, 
experiments interesting for distant observers, or 
restricted budgets imposed by varied donors. This 
point of view is hardly unconventional, but it has 
not been widely adopted by foundations or by 
prominent sources of philanthropic advice.
Following logically from that position was our 
view that the responses of influential leaders and 
institutions to changing conditions can be no 
more determined in advance than the progress of 
basic scientific research. Surprises abound in the 
real world, even in laboratories, where variables 
can be minimized. Consequently, we assumed 
that treating a highly complex, nonlinear field 
such as nature conservation and sustainable eco-
nomic development as if it were an engineering 
problem would express an unrealistic and self-
defeating perspective. That situation is common 
when private foundations adopt ambitious strate-
gies rather than more easily reached goals.
High-quality engineering is essential in construc-
tion projects, mechanical or electronic design, 
and manufacturing processes, in each of which 
most conditions can be managed. That level of 
control, however, is not available for attempts to 
stimulate and sustain major changes in economic, 
political, or social systems.  Based on those views, 
making mostly program grants as opposed to 
project grants and allowing substantial flexibility 
in spending these grants became a central feature 
of the Moving Spotlight style. We rejected the 
standard and rarely questioned assumption that 
projects designed in detail offer the obvious, fun-
damental mode for grantmaking.
The Golden Mean: Can Program Grants 
Serve Strategic Objectives?
Program grants occupy a middle position 
between unrestricted institutional support and 
highly defined project grants. For large (mostly 
U.S.-based) conservation organizations, program 
grants allowed us to help them launch operations 
in new areas or to strengthen specific parts of 
their already extensive agendas. With small non-
profit groups, mostly based in our target regions, 
program grants often covered much of what they 
were attempting to do, helping them to build new 
visibility, confidence, competence, and influence.
Except for supporting relevant conferences and 
similar events, we also minimized the use of one-
year grants on the premise that little truly influ-
ential action can occur in such short time frames. 
Often justified as a method for maintaining tight 
reins on grantees, annual grants can be expensive 
in staff effort for both donors and recipients. In 
that way, they generally reduce returns on philan-
thropic investments.
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A constant objective of the MacArthur program 
was the durable influence of grantees, ideally 
well beyond the term of our financial support. In 
effect, the goal was to help appropriate grantee 
organizations or programs to become institutions, 
implying long and influential lives for them. Re-
silient (and therefore durable) institutions are the 
indispensable instruments through which creative 
leadership is most effectively implemented and 
ambitious foundation goals can most reliably be 
advanced.
Thus the basic challenge was deciding how we 
could strengthen relevant organizations and 
expand the supply of individual leaders working in 
our target zones. To do that, we emphasized broad 
program grants for promising local organiza-
tions, funding for partnerships between them and 
industrial country institutions committed to their 
growth, and support of education and research 
opportunities for people living and working in the 
tropical biodiversity hotspots.
Predicting specific outcomes by certain dates as 
results of such grants would have been entirely 
unrealistic or would have led us to be satisfied 
with small, uncomplicated, and possibly trivial 
objectives. Program grants are about altering the 
circumstances in which any foundation’s strategic 
objectives occur. Through using them, we aimed 
to improve the prospects for our relative success 
in making progress toward our goals. 
A noteworthy and consequential result of award-
ing broad program grants is that recipients almost 
always spend relatively flexible funds with exqui-
site care. Nonprofit managers are strongly moti-
vated to use such money exactly when and where 
it will make the greatest difference to their success 
– as they are best qualified to judge.  Funds from 
closely restricted grant budgets are normally spent 
whether they are really needed or not. Giving 
grantees flexibility can in most cases lead to better 
results than maintaining tight control.  
Trust and Respect: What’s the True Story?  
A critical objective of the Moving Spotlight was 
to engender an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
respect among the foundation, its grantees, and 
other relevant actors, including those whose pro-
posals we rejected. Without such an atmosphere, 
no foundation will find it possible to achieve can-
did dialogue with its customers. Seeking honest 
exchanges between donors and grant seekers who 
are treated as partners rather than incompetent 
suspects can be a source of both efficiency and 
impact. 
Because the MacArthur program’s selection of its 
target regions was derived from three explicit, da-
ta-based criteria rather than unexplained prefer-
ences or unpredictably changing donor “interests,” 
we had the unusual advantage of operating with 
falsifiable strategic priorities. When a grant seeker 
questioned our geographic choices, we could say 
that we would change them if our policy-shaping 
data were incorrect. Taking this position helped 
us to maintain respectful relationships with our 
customers.
We also acted on the belief that demands by 
donors for highly detailed budgets, schedules, and 
frequent ”milestones” mostly display their misun-
derstanding of the challenges faced by nonprofit 
managers. Donor impact is clearly advanced by 
learning as much as possible from grant seekers, 
understanding their problems and how they func-
tion. Foundation officers can too easily preach to 
applicants for grants, learning little in the process.
A constant objective of the 
MacArthur program was the 
durable influence of grantees, 
ideally well beyond the term of our 
financial support. In effect, the goal 
was to help appropriate grantee 
organizations or programs to 
become institutions, implying long 
and influential lives for them.
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Another large factor shaping our tactics was the 
foundation’s strategic decision to work globally, 
meaning that we were a foreign agency in most of 
the places where we made grants. Being foreign 
(and American) meant that we needed to function 
in a low-key manner to escape suspicions that we 
had hidden agendas or sought domination. Not 
maintaining conspicuous field offices staffed with 
U.S. experts helped us in that respect.
We also recruited program officers who were ex-
perienced conservationists and natives of our fo-
cal areas to give us meaningful intelligence about 
subtle cultural and political factors, local perspec-
tives about grant seekers, and practical operating 
experience in those regions. They improved our 
understanding of the conditions under which 
local and regional organizations work in distant 
places and acted as sensitive bridges between the 
foundation and potential grantees. These program 
officers brought extensive personal networks to 
their work, and they conducted extended site 
visits to maximize their current knowledge of 
developments in their areas of responsibility. 
Showing respect for local leaders, operating under 
the radar of government agencies when necessary, 
and quietly supporting change agents were all 
core elements of their work as they carried out the 
Moving Spotlight process.
Put in other words, we tried to avoid behaving 
as if grant-seeking organizations exist to do the 
bidding of foundation officers who occupy Olym-
pian heights. If a foundation does not respect 
the knowledge and commitments of its grantees 
in the first place, awarding grants to inadequate 
recipients and attempting to instruct and guide 
them appeared to us to be a profoundly illogical 
and foolish way of operating. 
Flexibility Within Structure: Balancing 
Opposite Traits
A lesson of using the spotlight approach was that 
the apparently antagonistic attributes of structure 
and flexibility in a grantmaking program could, in 
fact, be complementary. Flexibility is a condition 
highly valued by people working in private foun-
dations. Trustees, managers, and program officers 
alike are often reluctant to commit themselves to 
policies that would limit their ability to make sub-
stantial, sometimes sudden, shifts or deviations in 
their grantmaking programs. The problem with 
that practice is the substantial risk it presents of 
enabling unfocused or capricious actions. 
The Moving Spotlight gave us a highly structured 
and disciplined style of grantmaking, but we also 
sought to display agility and responsiveness to 
unexpected developments. Using the spotlight 
rhythm, we maintained steady and predictable 
movements and focal points, but within that 
structure we tried to support innovators and un-
orthodox actions. Across the board, the complex-
ity and unpredictability of the many threats to 
biological diversity in the places where it was rich-
est led us to seek varied and flexible responses. 
At the same time, working globally with modest 
resources and a small staff led us to adhere to our 
tight, disciplined structure. The pervasive tension 
in that set of conditions shaped many tactical 
principles. (See Table 2.)
A simple way of expressing the desirable (and 
manageable) tension between structure and flex-
ibility in a foundation’s grantmaking practice is 
the image of a playground seesaw. (See Figure 
2.) The constant and very useful challenge is to 
stand with one foot on either side of the fulcrum, 
seeking to maintain equilibrium between these 
equally necessary qualities. Foundation work 
is not necessarily as easy as it looks: It calls for 
intense concentration and discipline to maintain 
one’s balance.
We also acted on the belief that 
demands by donors for highly 
detailed budgets, schedules, and 
frequent ”milestones” mostly 
display their misunderstanding of 
the challenges faced by nonprofit 
managers.
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Conclusion: So What?
The particular set of strategic and tactical choices 
adopted by the MacArthur environment pro-
gram is clearly not for everyone, nor should it be. 
Diversity, both in strategic objectives and operat-
ing methods, is a critical strength and value of 
private philanthropy that can (and should) elevate 
the creativity, resilience, and contributions of its 
grantees to the people they serve. Homogeniza-
tion among personal donors and private founda-
tions, however unlikely, is simply not a good idea.
Despite passing fads and the advocates of various 
“best practices,” American private philanthropy 
will remain largely eccentric and uncoordinated, 
and that is mostly a desirable condition. The 
range of issues and problems needing remedies 
will always be broad and evolving. No single set of 
values or frame of mind can adequately contend 
with all of them. Some donors will adopt the 
language of “strategic philanthropy.”  Others will 
make large endowment or capital gifts that aim 
for the long term and cannot be closely controlled 
TABLE 2  Moving Spotlight Tactical Principles
Structure
(Focus)
Flexibility
(Agility)
1.  Define, explain, and publish program guidelines 
to provide clearly articulated screens for managing 
new proposals. 
1.  Stay open to unexpected ideas; accept 
unsolicited inquiries as well as selectively inviting 
proposals in each program area.
2.  Choose well-defined geographic and thematic 
focal points to concentrate effort and avoid 
scattering within a global program.
2.  Inside specific regions and themes, find diverse 
grantees and actions to maximize impact and 
learning.              
3.  Award grants based on knowledge of frontline 
conditions and leaders gained in site visits by staff; 
paper alone is inadequate.
3.  Respond to local conditions and leadership by 
making grants for broad programs, not narrowly 
defined projects.
4.  Organize grants almost entirely in clusters 
awarded simultaneously to focus staff energy and 
present clear picture to board and public.
4.  Tailor the mix of grants in each cluster to fit 
diverse local priorities within range of program 
goals; no single predetermined approach.
5.  Seek mutual reinforcement or convergence 
among grants in each cluster to elevate leverage (or 
influence) of foundation grants.
5.  Diversify types of grantees, types of action, 
and levels of action supported by program (local, 
national, and transnational).
6.  Provide funds for program objectives in each 
major area over relatively long term; minimize short-
term projects.
6.  Limit long-term commitments to specific 
grantees; adjust composition of grant clusters at 
three-year intervals.
7.  Limit support for traditional roles of industrial 
country institutions; employ relatively restricted 
program grants.
7.  Emphasize actions that build resilient institutions 
in developing countries; make relatively unrestricted 
program grants.
8.  Coordinate actions, whenever possible, with 
other donors, including public sector agencies and 
other private foundations.
8.  Exercise the foundation’s freedom to support 
what other will not; take frequent calculated risks.
9.  Make payments in declining steps to reduce 
grantee’s expectations and risk of excessive 
dependence on one donor.
9.  Allow flexibility in budgets and timing of spending 
to serve grantees’ priorities and to support rapid 
responses to change.
10.  Commission independent evaluations of grant 
clusters at three-year intervals; use their findings in 
planning new clusters.
10.  Foster mutual trust with grantees by using 
clear, objective monitoring and evaluation; be 
partners, not judges.
11.   Listen, Learn and Adapt
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by them.8 It should be difficult to make the case, 
implicit in some currently popular rhetoric, that 
such capital gifts have little meaningful strategic 
value.  
Other donors may choose to emphasize short-
term methods, employing restricted project 
grants focused on detailed schedules or “mile-
stones” and precisely quantified “outcomes.” The 
likelihood of stimulating significant lasting results 
with that approach is open to serious question, 
but the unpredictability of social systems makes 
a diversity of donor tactics desirable. Choosing 
smaller and shorter-term strategic goals that are 
congruent with a donor’s motives and financial 
resources can be a reasonable course of action so 
long as the inherent limitations of that grantmak-
ing style are understood.
The basic premise of the Moving Spotlight was 
that our work aimed to strengthen  institutions 
and individual leaders who could carry on after 
our grants ended, thereby making the founda-
tion’s actions more valuable than the amount of 
8 Good examples of such gifts were the matching grants 
of $113 million to the University of California, Berkeley, 
in 2007 to create 100 endowed professorships, and $400 
million to Stanford University in 2001 for the humanities, 
sciences, and undergraduate instruction, awarded by the 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
dollars awarded. In one way, this approach was 
the opposite of the popular advice that private 
foundations should offer “more than just the 
money” by giving substantive guidance to their 
grantees. Yet by offering relatively flexible funds, 
we followed that advice in a different way, giving 
them trust and respect in addition to “just the 
money.” Outstanding as they were, we did not 
believe that our staff was qualified to offer mana-
gerial or programmatic direction to our grantees. 
When customers sought such advice, we were 
inclined to offer grant funds enabling them to hire 
consultants who possessed the right expertise and 
were not in the power position of our program 
officers.
Recognizing the inadequacy of our financial 
resources to produce durable change in the 
course taken by a complex global problem, we 
saw our basic challenge as struggling to stimulate 
more progress than we could actually pay for. We 
believed that foundation staff members are more 
likely to add value to the funds they are paid to al-
locate when they operate with that understanding 
of their work. Our principal technique for doing 
that was to seek the growth and adaptability of 
our grantees, gambling on their long-term influ-
ence and momentum when we could give them a 
boost with our program grants. 
Structure FlexibilityVS
FIGURE 2  Maintaining constructive tension in grantmaking tactics requires a careful balancing act.
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We viewed the basic effect of our program grants 
as the maintenance or acceleration of actions 
begun by others rather than the initiation of ac-
tions conceived by us. Our grants were intended 
in nearly every case to be the addition of some 
financial fuel to the gas tanks of vehicles that 
already existed, not ones that we had built.9 This 
position is the opposite of the “NIH (Not In-
vented Here) Syndrome” that characterizes the 
corporate attitudes and operating styles of some 
major donors.
The results of almost every foundation grant 
depend conclusively on the ability of grantees to 
attract funds from varied sources over the long 
haul. We called the independent decisions of 
other donors, customers, or government agencies 
to support the programs and policies initiated or 
advanced by our grantees the functional equiva-
lent of profit in philanthropy. In other words, the 
Foundation reaped a profit when other complete-
ly independent donors – sometime collaborators, 
but always beyond our control – chose to back 
the same actors or concepts that we had support-
ed, thereby sustaining their influence.10  
Results of this kind are also called leverage in 
philanthropy, a very different meaning from the 
business use of the word that refers to debt. Con-
cepts and grantees that attract diverse sources 
of support are on their way to long-term impact 
because they are passing the tough market tests 
that exist in the nonprofit world. 
Thinking about the context of philanthropic 
work, we viewed the remarkable freedom enjoyed 
by private foundations in the United States as a 
political product of the substantial contributions 
9 A major exception to that principle was the establishment 
by MacArthur of the World Resources Institute (WRI) in 
1982, before the Moving Spotlight was devised. WRI has 
clearly passed many market tests by attracting substantial 
funds from other donors over the past 30 years.
10 A rare but outstanding example of profitable collabora-
tion among foundations was the creation in 1991 of the En-
ergy Foundation through pooled contributions by MacAr-
thur, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Pew Charitable 
Trusts. Twenty-one years later, the Energy Foundation 
receives no funds from the three original donors, but has 
a much larger budget resulting from the decisions of more 
than a dozen other foundations to support its grantmaking 
programs.
made by their grantees to the public welfare, not 
as a result of the foundations’ extraordinary wis-
dom. Similarly, we observed that the lasting value 
of foundation actions follow from how well they 
exercise that freedom and achieve leverage (or 
profits), rather than from the size of their endow-
ments and grants budgets.
Although the public pays attention almost entirely 
to large grants and to actions of the largest do-
nors, we concluded that private foundations of all 
sizes can generate philanthropic profits through 
exercising their freedom creatively. By taking full 
advantage of their independence and selectively 
ignoring conventional wisdom about grantmak-
ing, small and mid-sized foundations often ac-
complish more than they can directly purchase. 
Their stories should be told and appreciated more 
widely.
The tale of the Moving Spotlight describes a 
long-term experiment aimed at gaining philan-
thropic profits made by one element of a large 
private foundation that chose to operate with 
a global perspective while also making grants 
The results of almost every 
foundation grant depend 
conclusively on the ability of 
grantees to attract funds from 
varied sources over the long haul. 
We called the independent decisions 
of other donors, customers, or 
government agencies to support the 
programs and policies initiated 
or advanced by our grantees the 
functional equivalent of profit in 
philanthropy. 
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with national and local objectives. Our experi-
ment is not likely to be adopted in detail by other 
foundations, and this report does not imply that 
it should be seen as a “best practice.” Some of our 
environmental tactics were a result of our board’s 
strategic decision to work in many countries. 
Consequently, some of our procedures were less 
relevant to the design of purely national or local 
giving programs. Most of them, however, raise 
questions that can usefully be considered by most 
foundation managers.
In any case, foundation program design and 
management must be understood as a craft, a 
combination of art and science, of beauty and 
usefulness, of subtlety and practicality (Sennett, 
2008). To produce superior results, craftsman-
ship requires individual skill and judgment rather 
than an industrial perspective or conformity to 
common patterns. The concept of craft, which 
entails both technique and creativity (or structure 
and flexibility) is extremely relevant to any careful 
consideration of foundation management and the 
pursuit of philanthropic influence. Craft work is 
akin to custom tailoring; it is made by hand.11 It 
does not lend itself to algorithms.
11 The GrantCraft program, initiated by the Ford Founda-
tion and now operated by the Foundation Center and the 
European Foundation Centre, is a valuable source of ideas 
about private foundation management. The Grantmaking 
School, operated by Michigan’s Grand Valley State Univer-
sity, is a good example of new (and overdue) attention to 
the professional training of foundation officers.
The simple point of this story is that grantmaking 
craft, or style, or tactics can be at least as signifi-
cant in foundation program design and manage-
ment (and probably to grantmaking effectiveness) 
as are substantive strategic choices.  This dynamic 
applies to any organized philanthropy, regardless 
of its size.
Elements of grantmaking style we have discussed 
include:
1. choices about the size of a foundation’s staff 
and the nature of its expertise,
2. choices about the timing and duration of most 
grant awards,
3. the use of simultaneously awarded portfolios 
of grants,
4. recurring external evaluation of program 
decisions and design,
5.  adopting data-driven strategic priorities that 
are open to challenge,
6. consistent and open explanation of decisions 
about applications for grants,
7. recurring meetings among grantees to de-
velop and share relevant knowledge,
8. building honest and trusting relationships 
with customers,
9. emphasis on durable institutions and cre-
ative leaders rather than artificially defined 
projects, and
10. a focus on long-term influence as opposed to 
short-term control.
All of these practices deal with relatively routine 
aspects of foundation management, and most of 
them can be applied to grantmaking programs 
regardless of their strategic objectives. While di-
verse, this list falls far short of covering the entire 
range of procedural options. Many other tactical 
techniques are available, such as matching grants, 
Grantmaking craft, or style, or 
tactics can be at least as significant 
in foundation program design and 
management (and probably to 
grantmaking effectiveness) as are 
substantive strategic choices. This 
dynamic applies to any organized 
philanthropy, regardless of its size.
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competitive prizes, and intermediary grantees. All 
of those methods and others not mentioned here 
deserve analysis and discussion among people 
concerned with the performance of private foun-
dations. They are all consequential, but no single 
approach can be described as a “best practice.” 
The unconventional procedures used by the 
MacArthur environment program were made 
possible by the particular circumstances of that 
foundation over more than 20 years. Those condi-
tions will not occur the same way elsewhere, but 
elements of the Moving Spotlight approach might 
be considered as foundation leaders think explic-
itly about the processes or style they use as well as 
the substance of their missions.
Those processes are tactics or methods for carry-
ing out any foundation’s work, and they are not 
the same as grantmaking strategies. The variety of 
tactical options is large, as some of the unortho-
dox choices described here are meant to suggest. 
Although strategy and tactics need to be congru-
ent, tactical or stylistic patterns warrant separate, 
serious consideration at least as rigorous as that 
sometimes given to choices about the objectives 
of a foundation’s giving.
Tactical principles like these can provide inter-
nal discipline for private foundations, a class of 
organizations subject to practically no external 
disciplinary pressures. Because self-discipline is 
nearly the only kind available to them, it deserves 
close and explicit attention from foundation 
trustees, managers, and staff.
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